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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
T UTAH, INC., a Utah
corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

TRAVELERS INDEl\:lNITY COMP ANY, a corporation authorized to do
business in the State of Utah,

12638

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Appellant, Diamond T Utah, Inc. brought an action against Respondent, Travelers Indemnity Company, who was appellant insurance carrier for the value
of a truck and trailer that had been sold on a conditional
sales contract and then repossessed by Appellant's
finance company, Pacific Finance Company and then
stolen back by the purchaser and subsequently wrecked.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Originally this matter was submitted to the trial
court by both the Appellant and the Respondent on motions for summary judgment. The court granted Respondent's motion and Appellant appealed and the
Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Diamond T
Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Company, et al. 21 Utah
2d 124, 441 P.2d 705 reversed the lower court and remanded it to the trial court to determine one disputed
issue of fact, to-\vit: whether the vehicle was actually
stolen by the conditional purchaser after it had been repossessed by Pacific or whether it was given back to the
condit:onal purchaser under some kind of agreement
made with Pacific. The Supreme Court in two different
paragraphs of its decision stated:
"We approve all of the actions of the court
below save only the resolution of the one genuine issue of fact remains, to-wit: whether the
vehicle in question was in fact stolen from the
storage lot, or driven away by him whose name
appears on the conditional sales contract as
buyer with the consent of the bailee under
some kind of arrangement theretofore made
with the Pacific Finance, Inc., the legal title
holder of said automobile . . . Should it be
ascerta;ned that the vehicle was stolen from the
bailee and remained in that status until
wrecked, then on the premises that appellant
still retained an insurable interest in said prop-
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erty by reason of its side agreement with
Pacific Finance Co. after repossession, plaintiff may recover."
That at a subsequent trial on this issue the trial court
found for the respondent. Appellant later made a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence
and error of law and filed its affidavit with the court,
but the court denied the motion.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's judgment, dismissing Appellant's complaint, on the grounds
that the evidence is competent and sufficient to find in
favor of the appellant. That in the alternative, for a
new trial on the basis of the newly discovered evidence.
OF FACTS
This is an action to recover under an automobile
insurance policy where the Utah Supreme Court found
the respondent to be liable if the appellant was able to
prove that the vehicle was actually taken from the
bailee by the conditional purchaser without permission
after it had been repossessed by the finance company.
For further facts see Statement of Kind of Case and
Disposition in Lower Court above.
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STATE1\'1ENT OF POINTS
POINT I
APPELLANT'S EVIDENCE WAS C01\'1PETENT AND SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT
THE VEHICLE 'VAS IN FACT STOLEN BY
THE CONDITIONAL PURCHASER AND
NOT TAKEN v\TITH THE PERl\'1ISSION OF
THE APPELLANT'S FINANCE COMPANY.
Appellant contends that where business entries
and memorandums are made at a time where there is no
motive to misrepresent and under conditions to make
them reliable, and they represent the only available evidence then such entries and memorandums are admissible in evidence. This is so even if the person who made
the memorandum is deceased or beyond the jurisdiction
of the court or otherwise unavailable as a witness, for the
person who has custody of the records or knows concerning them can testify as to the custom by which they
were made and the accuracy of the records. See 30
Am.J ur.2d, Evidence, See's. 927, 928 and 949;
32 CJS, Evidence, See's. 682 and 683; Jones on Evidence, 5th ed. Vol. 3, See's. 609-620.
l\1r. Scoville testified that he was the District
l\'.Ianager of Pacific's office in Salt Lake City at the
time the unit was repossessed and allegedly stolen and
that he had personally handled the Diamond T account

5

and had complete knowledge and supervision of it. He
stated that he was especially aware of this particular
account and transaction because of the sizeable investment that his company had in Diamond T accounts and
that his credit department was breathing down his back
to see that every phase of it was under control. He further stated that Pacific had been attempting to repossess this unit for some time and when they loc1:1ted
it in 'Viscons:n, they repossessed it and took control of
it. He further stated that he did not at any time give
permission to l\1r. Scott, the conditional purchaser, that
he could retake the unit nor did he give permission to
the Pacific branch office in l\!Iadison, 'i\Tisconsin where
the unit was repossessed that it could be returned to the
conditional purchaser and Pac;fic policy was that only
the office who issued the repossession order could revoke it. In fact, he stated that in view of the trouble
they had had with this particular purchaser, they would
not release this unit under any conditions. R. 174-180.
Appellant ;ntroduced Exhibit 2-P which is a letter
taken from the business files of the Salt Lake City office of Pacific by l\fr. Scoville. The letter was written
by a l\Ir. 0. L. Shapley, who was a subordinate to Mr.
Scoville, to l\ir. Hanson of Pacific office in Madison,
'Visconsin. It states that the unit was repossessed for
the Salt Lake City branch and subquently without permission of the Salt Lake City branch was removed
indicating that the unit was in fact stolen. Mr. Shapley
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further requests information as to where the unit had
been stored so that the dealer, Diamond T, could make a
stolen truck report to their insurance company, which
information was added to the letter by l\1r. Hanson and
returned to l\lr. Shapley. R-177. The Defendant on
cross examination of l\'Ir. Scoville introduced Exhibits
4-D and 5-D 'vhich also came from the business files
of the Salt Lake City branch of Pacific which Mr. Scoville had control over and knowledge of. Defendant
contends that Appellant's evidence was heresay and
therefore inadmissible. Plaintiff submits that the law
is well settled, that it is an exception to the heresay rule,
that business entries may be introduced by one having
complete knowledge and supervision of the entries.
I refer the court to the case of In re Richards
Estate, 5 Utah 2d 106, 297 P2d 542. In that case the
deceased left a will with a later codicil that materially
changed the will. The executor contended that she lacked
the mental capacity to execute the codicil and introduced
hospital records together with the testimony of the hospital librarian who was the custodian of the records.
The court after discussing the proper foundation held
that the records were admissible and stated:
The medical records librarian testify that
she 'vas the custodian of the records, and that
although she did not make the entries herself,
she was familiar with them and that they were
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prepared in the ordinary course of hospital
business."
Again our court in the case of State v. Davie, 121
Utah 189, 240 P.2d 65 where the defendant contended
the trial court improperly admitted in evidence records
of a telephone company, a power and light company,
and an insurance agency which were identified by employees or attendants in the several offices where the
records were kept. The court held:
"The records referred to were properly identified by employees or attendants in the several
of fices as records kept in the regular course
of bus:ness. While these records as used in this
case, do not strictly speaking fall within the
"Shop book Rule", they are admissible for the
same reasons which gave rise to that rule which
has long since had the approval of this court.
See cases listed in Clayton v. JJletropolitan Life
Insurance Company, 96 Utah 331, 85 P.2d 819,
120 ALR 11, 17. They were correctly admitted in evidence under what was called "the regular entry rule" ... It )s no longer necessary
to have the person 'vho made the records
identify them. If he cannot be obtained as a
witness, other employees who know the facts
can do so."
The case of "!v"orthcrcst Inc. v. Tt"alker Bank and
Trust Compan,y, et al., 122 Utah 268, 248 P.2d 692 was
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an action to quiet title to certain real property plaintiff
having received a quit claim deed from defendant. The
court allowed Mr. McGee, the bank employee, who was
not associated with the bank at the time the deed was
given, to explain the bank's records to the effect that
the quit claim deed was only as a return of a security
interest held by the bank. The plaintiff contended the
testimony of Mr. McGee concerning the bank's records
was improperly admitted. The court held:
"True it is that Mr. J\1cGee was not associated
with the bank until some years after the transaction took place and he had no first hand
knowledge of it. This did not disqualify him
from testifying. He was familiar with the records of the bank made concurrent with the
transaction and was competent to identify them
and their contents."
I also refer the court to the case of Clayton v.
Metropolitan Life lnsu,rance Company, 96 Utah 33I,
85 P.2d 8I9, 120 ALR II, I7. The Clayton case refers
to the Arkansas case of Adler v. New York Life;1nsurance Company, 33 F.2d 827 in which it was contended that certain medical records. were not admissible
because the attending doctor was deceased. The court
allowed the doctor's partner and secretary to testify as
to what the office method was and that the typed records were the records as dictated by the deceased
doctor.
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1\lr. 0. J. Wilkinson, President and general manager of Diamond T, testified concerning a conversation
that he had with the conditional purchaser, Mr. Scott,
as brought out in defendant's cross examination of Mr.
Scoville. l\1r. Wilkinson stated that he did have a conYersation with Scott, but told him that the matter was
out of h"s hands and that it was completely up to Pacific
and that the only way Scott could prevent the repossession was to pay the money due on the unit. Mr. Wilkinson specifically stated that he did not give Scott permission to retake the unit nor did he give permission
to any of f;ce of Pacific to return the unit to Mr. Scott.
R. 205. The Supreme Court in its original decision on
this matter settled this question when it stated:
"about this time the buyer called Appellant's
president on the telephone and attempted to
make arrangements so that he could regain
possession of the stored vericle. He was advised to take the matter up with the finance
company, the legal title holder, of the said conditional sales contract."
I call the court's attention to the testimony of both
l\ir. Scoville and Mr. 'Vilkinson who on direct examinafon specifically stated that they did not give permission to l\lr. Scott that he could retake the unit nor
was permission given to anyone else that the unit could
be returned to :Mr. Scott. That is the direct testimony
of the witnesses and is not based on exhibits which de-
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fendant claims are heresay and defendant failed to offer
any testimony which would rebut the statements of
either l\'1r. Scoville or l\!Ir. Wilkinson.
POINT II
EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS THAT APPELLANT'S EVIDENCE IS HE RE SAY,
THERE IS OTHER COMPETENT EVIDENCE
BEFORE THE COURT THAT SUPPORT APPELLANT'S CONTENTION.
Respondent below on cross examination of Mr.
Scoville, introduced Exhibits 4-D and 5-D which came
from the business files of the Salt Lake City branch
of Pacific over which l\1r. Scoville had control. Exhibit 4-D is a memorandum of a telephone conversation
between Mr. Shapley of the Salt Lake City branch and
Mr. C. J. Hanson of the l\!Iadison, Wisconsin branch.
Exhibit 5-D is a statement by
Shapley pertaining
to the matter before the court. The two exhibits together
indicate that a Mr. Edgar Cheves who had driven the
unit, together with the purchaser Scott to Madison,
''r:sconsin called Mr. Shapley at Salt Lake City and
stated that it was his misunderstanding that Pacific was
looking for the unit and for the consideration of $75.00
he was willing to notify the nearest office of Pacific
as to its location. Mr. Shapley then contacted Mr. Hanson in Madison, Wisconsin who called l\1r. Cheves and
agreed to pay him the amount requested. Mr. Cheves
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then drove the unit to the office of Pacific in Madison,
YVisconsin where :Mr. Hanson took possession of it. Mr.
Hanson, together with
Cheves, then drove the unit
to Chief Auto Parts where it was parked and stored.
The repossession apparently took place at the beginning
of the weekend or during the weekend for the exhibits
continue and state that on
morning Mr. Hanson went out to where the unit was parked and he found
it gone and the attendant stated that Scott had shown
up and wanted to get something out of the unit and got
in and drove it away. "fflr. Hanson states that he does not
ltnow how he got in because he, Mr. Hanson, had the
keys. R. 184-193
Exhibits 4-D and 5-D were offered by Respondent
and were allegedly tentatively received under a stipulation between counsel and the court that objections were
reserved and the admissibility of all evidence would be
ruled on by the court after the briefs 'had been filed.
Appellant takes exception to this Stipulation for at no
time during the trial did plaintiff and defendant make
such a stipulation nor did the court ask for one and the
record does not reflect such a stipulation. The court did
state that all exhibits would be received subject to the
objection made and that the court would have to read
them. R. 193 and 195.
After the filing of the briefs the court made the
following findings of fact: "Plaintiff failed to intro-
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duce any competent evidence to show that the tractor
trailer ;n question was a 8tolen vehicle and all of the offered evidence concerning that material fact was heresay and inadmissible." R. 157. The court failed to take
into consideration, however, the fact that Exhibits 4-D
and 5-D were offered by the Respondent and the Respondent did not object to their admission on the grounds
of heresay. It is a fundamental rule of law that when
heresay evidence is offered and admitted without objection that it is competent to support a decision on the
merits of the case.

It may be argued that the court sustained appellant's objection to the evidence by its findings of fact
and conclusions of law, hmvever, it has been held that
where it is agreed that a ruling on an objection may be
reserved until the argument of the case, if the objection
is not renewed and the court's attention directed to it,
the objection will be deemed waived. 53 Am.Jur.
Trial, Sec. 146; see annotation 88 ALR 2d, 12;
Hoxie the Home Insurance Company, 32 Conn. 21, 85
. A_m. Dec. 240. It is clear, therefore, that the exhibits
offered by the respondent were admitted by the trial
court without objection by the respondent and without
objection by the appellant. The court's ruling, therefore, that such exhibits are heresay and inadmissible is
improper. It is well established that heresay evidence,
otherwise inadmissible, which is admitted without objection may properly be considered by the trier of facts
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and that it should be considered by the trial court in
passing upon the issues before it and the appellate court
on review.

See 30

Am.J ur.

2d,

Evidence,

Sec.

1103: TVhitc v. Newman, IO Utah 2d 62, 348 P.2d 343;
Child v. ChJild, 8 Utah 2d 261, 270; 79 ALR 2d 890.

POINT III
RESPONDENT IS BOUND BY THE EVIDE:\TCE 'VHICH HE INTRODUCED EVEN
THOUGH IT SUPPORTS APPELLANT'S
CLAil\I.
It is fundamental that one introducing documentary evidence vouches for its accuracy and is bound by
its recitals. See, Snell Isle the Commissioner, 90 F.2d
481, cert. den. 302 U.S. 734; 58 S. Ct. 120, 82 Law Ed.
568. Respondent, therefore, should not be heard to
elaim that the evidence ·which it introduced is heresay or
otherwise inadmissible. It appears, therefore, that if the
ev:dence contained in respondent's exhibits supports the
contention that the Pacafic was the last rightful possessor of the unit and that no permission was given to
Jlr. Scott or to anyone else to retake the unit or to deliver it out of that possession that there is a preponderance of the evidence that the tractor trailer was stolen
or otherwise wrongfully removed from the possession
of Pacific or the bailee Chief Auto Parts.
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POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
THE APPELLANT'S
FOR A NEW
TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS OF THE NEWLY
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND ERROR IN
LAW.
Subsequent to the trial of this matter, the appellant,
pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, filed a motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence, material for the party making ap·
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence
have discovered and produced at trial and error in law;
together with affidavits setting forth to the court what
the testimony would be and the materiality of the testimony. The court in denying appellant's motion indicated that this matter had been before the court for a
number of years and the evidence could have been dis·
covered sooner. The new evidence is the testimony of
Mr. C. J. Hanson who is a former employee of appellant's finance company in Madison, ,,Visconsin and was
the person who under the direction of l\1r. Scoville ef·
f ected the repossession of the unit in question. Appel·
lant had made inquiry of this witness prior to trial, but
was informed that he was no longer employed with
Pacific and his whereabouts were unknown. The witness
was out of state, being in the State of Wisconsin and
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his whereabouts was not readily ascertainable by the
appellant.
In the case of Crelin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122;
247 P.2d 264, which was an action for slander, the defendant having accused the plaintiff of being a prostitute. The court found for the plaintiff and the
defendant made a motion for a new trial having obtained information where the plaintiff had formerly
lived and practiced her so-called profession. The court
reasoned that under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
the defendant might have easily obtained the informat'on, as to where she had lived and operated, by submitting interrogatories. Nevertheless, the new trial was
properly granted on the showing by the defendant that
he did not learn of the newly discovered evidence until
after the trial of the case. The court held:
A wide discretion is reposed in the trial court
in granting or denying a new trial on the basis
of newly discovered evidence. The primary
concern of the court is that justice be done, and
the granting of such a mot'.on is only reviewable in this court on the question of abuse of
discretion. Greco v. Gentile, 88 Utah 255, 53
P.2d 1155. True, the exercise of judicial discretion in such instance must be based on a
show;ng of substantial material evidence, from
which it appears there is at least a reasonable
likelihood that it would affect the result in a
new trial. See, Bowers v. Gray, 99 Utah 336,
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106 P.2d 765; Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381,
105 P.2d 176; Jansen v. Logan City, 89 Utah
347, 57 P.2d 708. The granting of a new trial

should only be done when sound judicial discretion, in the interest of doing justice between
the parties, so requires. See, 66 C.J.S., New
Trial, Sec. 201, p. 500 et seq."

In the early Utah case of Van Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank, 48 Utah 606, 161 Pac. 50, the court in quoting from decisions from other jurisdictions provided
that the trend of modern authority is to grant a new
trial when the newly discovered cumulative evidence is
of such a nature as to render a change in the results fairly probable or will clear up what was doubtful at the
trial.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Jensen 'l'.
Logan City, supra, shows the liberal interpretation that
the court places on a motion for a new trial. In that case
the plaintiff brought an action against the city for personal injury as a result of a wire fence left on a sidewalk by the city. The trial court awarded judgment to
the city and refused to grant plaintiff's motion for a
new trial which was based on the testimony of an individual who rendered assistance to the plaintiff at the
time he was injured and even though the plaintiff knew
of him and failed to call him as a witness, the Supreme
Court reversed the trial court and granted a new trial
and stated:
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"\Vhere disinterested testimony on the vital
point in a case is very scant, newly discovered
testimony on that point appearing from affidavits in support of the motion for a new trial
was not guilty of indiligence in failing to obtain
the w:tness for the trial, and that there is no
element of holding such witness in reserve for
purposes of obtaining a new trial-generally
picturesquely denominated in slang phraseology as '"an ace in the hole"'-and it appears
likely that such evidence would change the result, a new trial should be granted. While the
granting or ref using of the motion lies in the
sound discretion of the court, where there is
grave suspicion that justice may have miscarried because of the lack of enlightenment
on a vital point which new evidence will apparently supply, and the other elements attendant
on obtaining a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence are present, it would be
an abuse of sound discretion not to grant the
same. If we take the deduct;ons which respondent Lumber Company lays down on page 38
of its Brief as the criteria which must be
present as controlling the granting or refusal
of a new trial, we believe this case will furnish
the requirements. Respondent says: "'It is
only under very special c:rcumstances, because
of the quality or type of proposed evidence and
where it makes clear a fact it was formerly
in doubt that new trials are granted to allow
the <lef eated party to add cumulative evidence,
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newly discovered, and then only where there is
a clear probability that the result of the new
trial will be different."' (Italics supplied)
Appellant contends that length of time that a case
has been before the courts has no bearing on a motion
for new trial, but it depends on whether the party is attempting to hold a witness back as "an ace in the hole"
and whether the testimony would be material and would
affect the outcome of the case and if it is material and
would effect the outcome then the new trial should be
granted so that justice might be acquired by the parties.
Appellant also moves for a new trial on the grounds of
an error in law as set forth in Points I and II of this
Brief.
CONCLUSION
The only question which the court must decide is
whether the unit \Vas taken by the conditional purchaser
without the permission of appellant's finance company.
Appellant submits that its testimony and exhibits are competent and admissible to show that perrnission was not given to the conditional purchaser, but even
if the court finds that appellant's evidence is heresay,
there is other competent evidence before the court as
introduced by the respondent that ilupports appellant's
contenf on.
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The respondent did not object to the evidence he
introduced and the appellant's objection was never
sustained and not renewed at the conclusion of the case
or at the argument of the case on the written briefs.
In considering all the evidence before it, the court
must find that there is a preponderance of evidence in
support of appellant's position and find in favor of the
appellant and against the respondent reversing the decision of the trial court. That in the alternative, the appellant is entitled to a new trial on the grounds of the
newly discovered evidence and the error in law as to the
admissibility of the evidence.
Respectfully submitted,

BETTIL YON & HOWARD
I-IOMER F. 'VILKINSON
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant

